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Abstract Base-rate neglect is a robust experimental finding that indi-
viduals do not update their prior beliefs according to the Bayes’ rule and,
typically, underestimate their posterior probabilities. Another empirical find-
ing is that individuals often do not acquire information even when there are
no strategic considerations and the cost of new information is justifiable
economically. This paper combines these two different fields of research.
Specifically, it is demonstrated that base-rate neglect may lead to imperfect
information acquisition. An application to the pricing of new financial assets
as well as general implications for the socially optimal pricing of information
are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Bayesian inference is a normative model for updating prior beliefs upon ar-
rival of a new information (e.g. Baron, 2004). However, there is an extensive
experimental evidence that individuals do not use the Bayes’ rule, which be-
came known as base-rate neglect or base-rate fallacy (e.g. Kahneman and
Tversky, 1972, 1973; Bar-Hillel, 1980). Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) find
that the most frequently used non-Bayesian algorithm is a computation of
the joint occurrence. Compared to the Bayesian inference, joint occurrence
leads to the underestimation of the posterior probabilities.
This paper investigates the decisions of the non-Bayesian individuals
when they acquire information. The imperfect information acquisition is
often rationalized in the strategic setup (e.g. Hurkins and Vulkan, 2004)
when an individual who acquires information reveals this information by his
or her actions to the opponents and gets exploited by the latter. When in-
formation has no strategic value, the fact that individuals do not acquire full
information is typically explained by information costs (e.g. Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980). However, Ro¨theli (2001) finds experimental evidence that
individuals do not acquire information when the economic benefit from the
new information exceeds its cost.
This paper demonstrates that, setting strategic and cost considerations
aside, imperfect information acquisition can be explained by non-Bayesian
updating, i.e. base-rate neglect. For example, consider a situation when
the acquired information is used for updating the subjective beliefs about
a bad state of the world (e.g. Ro¨theli, 2001). Individuals employing the
non-Bayesian inference such as a joint occurrence underestimate the correct
probability of the bad state given currently available information. Therefore,
such individuals need to acquire less information than Bayesians to become
sufficiently convinced that the bad state is not likely to occur. A simple
model presented in this paper demonstrates that individuals employing joint
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occurrence as a proxy for the Bayes’ rule may not acquire full information
even if information is costless but arrives sequentially.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
formal model. Section 3 discusses applications of the results from Section 2.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a project that delivers payoff u < 0 when the state of the world is
L and payoff u > 0 otherwise. An individual decides whether to participate
in the project or to abstain, in which case he or she receives a zero payoff
for certain. Let η(0) ∈ (0, 1) denote the prior subjective probability that the
state of the world is L. Thus, ex ante, the expected payoff of the project is
pi(0) := η(0) · u + (1− η(0)) · u. (1)
Before making the decision, the individual can sequentially acquire units
of information at no cost. Only one unit of information is informative. If the
state of the world is L, the acquired information is informative with proba-
bility q ∈ (0, 1). If the state of the world is not L, the acquired information
is always uninformative. Therefore, after receiving the informative unit of
information, the individual knows with certainty that the state of the world
is L.
Let η(n) denote the subjective probability that the state of the world is
L after n units of information are acquired, all being uninformative. In this
case the expected payoff of the project is
pi(n) := η(n) · u + (1− η(n)) · u. (2)
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After n uninformative units of information, the next unit of information
is informative with probability q · η(n). In this case, the individual gets a
zero payoff. After n uninformative units of information, the next unit of
information is uninformative with probability 1 − q · η(n). In this case, the
individual gets the expected payoff pi(n+1). The n+1-st unit of information
is acquired if and only if
pi(n) ≤ (1− q · η(n)) · pi(n + 1). (3)
The last inequality can be rewritten as Condition 1 (see Appendix for
mathematical derivation).
Condition 1 After n uninformative units of information, further informa-
tion is acquired if and only if
η(n + 1) +
1
q
(1− η(n + 1)
η(n)
) ≥ 1
1− u / u.
2.1 Bayesian Inference
Consider an individual updating his or her subjective probability η(.) accord-
ing to the Bayes’ Rule (4).
η(n + 1) =
(1− q)n+1 · η(n)
(1− q)n+1 · η(n) + 1 · (1− η(n)) (4)
When equation (4) is plugged into Condition 1, simple algebra yields that
Condition 1 is always satisfied (mathematical derivation is presented in the
Appendix). Therefore, a Bayesian would always acquire all available infor-
mation. Interestingly, the same result holds if the individual does not know
q and uses adaptive learning to update sequentially the subjective beliefs
4
about the state of the world and the information distribution (according to
the Bayes’ rule).
2.2 Non-Bayesian inference
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995, p.694) find that the most frequently used
non-Bayesian algorithm is joint occurrence. In our model, following this
algorithm, an individual updates his or her subjective believes η(.) according
to equation (5).
η(n + 1) = q · η(n) (5)
With every uninformative unit of information, the subjective probability
η(.) decreases by a constant factor, which equals to the probability of receiv-
ing an informative unit of information in the state L. Plugging equation (5)
into Condition 1, we obtain inequality (6) as the condition for information
acquisition after n uninformative signals.
η(n + 1) +
1− q
q
≥ 1
1− u / u. (6)
From equation (5) it follows that η(n + 1) converges to zero as n goes to
infinity. Therefore, for large n, equation (6) can be rewritten as
q ≤ u− u
2u− u. (7)
Notice that u−u2u−u ∈ [0.5, 1], u−u2u−u = 0.5 if u = 0 and u−u2u−u = 1 if u = 0.
Therefore, if q < 0.5, i.e. informative information comes with low probabil-
ity, a non-Bayesian, similar to the Bayesian, will always acquire all available
information. For q ∈ [0.5, 1), a non-Bayesian may acquire incomplete in-
formation if the potential loss u from the project is small and informative
information comes with high probability. Incomplete information acquisition
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does not occur if the potential gain u from the project is small and/or infor-
mative information comes with low probability. Intuitively, if the individual
knows that participation in the project may be costly, i.e. |u | is large rela-
tive to u, and if he or she knows that acquired information is unlikely to be
informative, i.e. q is small, then he or she will seek full information.
Let us now determine the maximum number of informational units sought
if information acquisition remains incomplete. Using recursive equation (5),
the condition for further information acquisition (6) can be rewritten as
(q)n+1 · η(0) + 1− q
q
≥ 1
1− u / u. (8)
In case incomplete information acquisition is possible, let n∗ be the first
natural number for which inequality (8) does not hold. A non-Bayesian,
then, chooses to acquire at most n∗ units of information. The right hand
side of inequality (8) is decreasing in −uu¯ . Therefore, n∗ must be increasing
in −uu¯ . In a population of heterogeneous individuals, more risk averse indi-
viduals fear the potential loss |u| relatively more than they value u.1 Thus,
in a population of individuals with different risk attitudes, more risk averse
individuals acquire more information.
It is interesting to note that, if information is idiosyncratic, even identical
(non-Bayesian) individuals facing exactly the same decision problem may
take different actions. At first sight, this appears to be intuitive as the
individuals are facing a random process. In the present setting, however, all
uncertainty can be resolved at no cost. This fact notwithstanding, if the state
of the world is L, the individuals who receive by chance n∗ uninformative
units of information will stop the information acquisition and participate
in the project. Other individuals with the same preferences who receive the
informative unit of information will not participate in the project. Moreover,
1Increased loss aversion (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1991), will have a similar effect.
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the smaller n∗ the larger the fraction of individuals choosing the project in
the state L. Thus, the randomness of the process becomes prevalent although
it could be resolved at no cost.
3 Applications
To highlight the consequences of our findings, we will discuss two applications
- one economic and one political - in this section. First we will consider
financial markets. Specifically, we will discuss the case of IPOs and show how
our model may help to understand different patterns in the price movements
for an asset when first traded at the stock market. Second, we will consider
personal voting behaviour. We will argue that too many good news for
a party before the election may be detrimental to their success. We will
conclude this section with a reference to further potential applications. These
will also emphasise the impact of the present approach on the socially optimal
pricing of information.
3.1 IPOs
When a firm goes public, i.e. decides to sell firm shares (assets) at the stock
market, we often observe that the new asset is oversubscribed and that first
trading prices are far above the price at the end of the bookbuilding. Still,
occasionally, only a short time after the emission, we observe that the asset
price drops - sometimes even below the emission price.2 In the following, we
argue how our model may shed some light on this phenomenon.
Consider an asset A that has entered the bookbuilding phase. I.e. the
assets are known to be sold at a price p∗ ∈ [p−, p+]. For simplicity reasons,
2A perfect example for this is the IPO of Plasmaselect, DE0005471809.
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we assume that p+ = p− so that p∗ is actually known to the investors at the
beginning of the bookbuilding. The total number of assets is denoted by y.
Bookbuilding closes at time T .
Until T , investors can acquire information about the fundamentals of
the firm through different media. We will assume that this information is
provided for free and that at T all information about the asset publicly
known. With all information at hand, the asset is valued pf by the market.
The market value pf can be either larger or smaller than p∗. To adapt this
to our model, we can think of information as being either confirming or
disconfirming for the hypothesis that pf > p∗. Confirming and disconfirming
information then corresponds to uninformative and informative information
respectively. Information is released at random.
We assume that investors follow the media and order assets if their sub-
jective belief that pf > p∗ is weak. The number of assets ordered by the
investors until time T is denoted by x. If more assets are ordered than sold,
i.e. if x > y, we assume that there is an access demand at the first trading,
t1, and that the price follows the law of demand. We denote the price of
the asset at t1 by p1. Thus, if x > y then p1 > p∗. The price at time t2,
some time after the emission, will be according to the fundamentals, i.e. the
market will correctly incorporate all available information with time. The
complete time scale is depicted in Figure 1.
!
T, p∗ t1, p1 t2, pf
" " "
information
market trade...
t
Figure 1: The sequence of events.
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Consider the case where investors are non-Bayesians and where discon-
firming information comes with low probability. According to our results
from the previous section, there is a possibility of many investors believing
that asset A is a desirable investment. Thus, with positive probability, x > y
even if the state of the world is L, in which case we will observe pf < p∗ < p1.
Interestingly, if we consider the case of both Bayesians and non-Bayesians
being present at the market, there may even be an incentive for the Bayesians
to order the asset although the state of the world is L. Recall that Bayesians
will always acquire full information before deciding on the investment. Yet,
even if an investor is fully informed about the state of the world he may have
observed that there was a long sequence of positive signals at the beginning.
If he infers that most likely many of the non-Bayesians will order the asset,
he may do so as well. The difference between the Bayesian and the non-
Bayesians only is that the latter, if their demand was not satisfied due to
oversubscription, will cause an access demand at the first trading at the
stock market whereas the former will immediately sell the asset, knowing
that the price is bound to fall.
3.2 Voting Behaviour
Another phenomenon our model may help to explain is related to elections.
Often different measures of public sentiment some days prior to an election
indicate that one party is almost certain to win. Yet, in some cases during the
last days things become more contentious and finally, the eve of the election,
the respective party may even be runners-up only - often accompanied by low
election participation. The institutes responsible for opinion research then
often go to some length explaining how and why this could have happened.
In the following, we will try to highlight how our model may facilitate the
arguing of these institutes.
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For the sake of argument, we consider two parties, C and D. They are
competing for the composition of a political body (or for the right to decide
on a political position). We assume that all individuals would rather spend
their day not voting if they knew, that their favorite party was going to win
anyway. However, if they knew that things are less clear or that the outlook
is bad, they would rather support their favorite party through their vote.
Now, each day the news will be full of information about the relative
standing of the two parties. Although this information is assumed to be
correct, it is random in that each day both of the two parties will engage
in campaigning which may have both positive as well as negative effects on
public sentiment. According to our model non-Bayesian supporters of, say,
party C will follow the news and decide to go on vacation rather than to go to
the elections if they are sufficiently confident that this will not be detrimental
to their party. As soon as they have made their decision they will no longer
follow the news.3 Thus, if due to some unforseen event party D manages to
(almost) catch up with party C on the last stretch, the missing voters may
prove to be decisive - but in favour of party D.
3.3 Other Applications
Two other areas for which our results appear to be relevant are marketing
and health economics.
For example, advertising a search good (see Nelson 1970 and 1974) in a
way that conveys only little information will also be better than being more
specific, especially if the product has close substitutes. If a consumer believes
to have some positive information about one product but none about the
others, this may suffice to decisively influence his buying decision. Assuming
3Another possibility is to say that the vacation entails a commitment.
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that the target group for the product is very diverse, it may indeed be optimal
to release only information that has almost no practical value, provided it is
likely to be construed as positive by everyone.
Our model may also be relevant for decisions on information acquisition
about ones own health status. In particular, presume that individuals dis-
regard the impact of the frequency of their own doctoral visits on insurance
premiums. In this context, our findings indicate that non-Bayesians are less
likely to consult several doctors to reassure themselves about a certain di-
agnosis.4 Thus, when contemplating, for example, the introduction of an
additional cost per consultation which is privately payed by the patient, one
should consider the impact on individual behaviour. Non-Bayesians, who
are anyway prone to acquire incomplete information, will be affected more
strongly than Bayesians. A cost that is socially optimal considering only
Bayesian individuals will tend to be too prohibitive for non-Bayesians. Thus,
smaller extra payments will be socially optimal if the relative proportion of
non-Bayesians in the population is large.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides yet another explanation for imperfect information ac-
quisition. When information has no strategic value and it is costless but
acquired sequentially, an individual may not acquire full information if he
or she does not update the subjective beliefs according to the Bayes’ rule.
Specifically, incomplete information acquisition occurs when the informative
unit of information comes with high probability and the risky project bears a
relatively small loss. Intuitively, a non-Bayesian underestimates the posterior
probability of the bad state of the world to being true. Hence, such an indi-
vidual can interpret a limited sequence of uninformative units of information
4Taking the opposite view, maybe hypochondriacs are simply overly eager Basyeians.
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as a ”convincing” evidence that the bad state of the world is false. In con-
trast, a Bayesian is never satisfied with a limited sequence of uninformative
signals.
In many economic problems where incomplete information acquisition
was traditionally explained by cost reasons, our results indicate that the role
of the cost may be overestimated. Certainly the presence of costs negatively
affects the amount of information gathered. However, if information acquisi-
tion is already incomplete when information is costless, it will be all the more
so when the various costs of information are taken into account. Moreover,
in the presence of costs, information acquisition may also be below the pay-
off maximising level. Therefore, our finding explains the experimental data
reported in Ro¨theli (2001) where, in the presence of cost, less information
is acquired than would be optimal considering expected payoffs only. Inter-
estingly, subjects with an economic background seem to value information
higher (and to process it more effectively) whereas non-economists show a
high tendency to disregard the information or to construe it wrongly. One
possible explanation might be that economists are more familiar with Bayes’
rule. It would be interesting to learn more about the relative proportions of
Bayesian and non-Bayesians in different social groups. In particular for the
calculation of socially optimal costs of information, sound knowledge about
the presence of non-Bayesians in the population appear to be crucial.
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Appendix
Derivation of Condition 1 To derive Condition 1 note that equation
(3) can be rewritten as
η(n)u + (1− q · η(n))u ≤ (1− qη(n)) · [η(n + 1)u + (1− η(n + 1))u].
Simple algebra yields
u(η(n)− (1− qη(n))η(n + 1)) ≤ u((1− η(n + 1)) · (1− qη(n))− 1 + η(n)))
u(η(n)− (1− qη(n))η(n + 1)) ≤ u(−η(n + 1) · (1− qη(n)− qη(n) + η(n)))
(u− u) · (η(n)− (1− q · η(n)) · η(n + 1)) ≥ uqη(n)
(η(n)− (1− q · η(n)) · η(n + 1))
qη(n)
≥ u
u− u
η(n + 1) +
η(n)− η(n + 1)
qη(n)
≥ 1
1− u / u
η(n + 1) +
1
q
(1− η(n + 1)
η(n)
) ≥ 1
1− u / u
This is exactly the condition 1. !
Proof that Bayesian inference leads to complete information ac-
quisition The right hand side of Condition 1 is always smaller than 1, i.e.
1
1− u / u < 1.
Let us show that the left hand side of Condition 1 is always larger than one
when equation (4) holds, i.e. ∀n ∈ N it holds:
η(n + 1) +
1
q
(1− η(n + 1)
η(n)
) > 1.
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This is equivalent to:
qη(n + 1) + (
η(n)− η(n + 1)
η(n)
) > q.
The next step is to express η(n + 1) in terms of η(n). This gives:
qη(n)
(1− q)n+1 · η(n)
(1− q)n+1η(n) + 1− η(n) +η(n)−
(1− q)n+1 · η(n)
(1− q)n+1η(n) + 1− η(n) > qη(n).
Further equivalence transformations yield
(1− q)η(n) > (1− qη(n)) (1− q)
n+1 · η(n)
(1− q)n+1 · η(n) + 1− η(n)
1 >
(1− qη(n)) · (1− q)n
(1− q)n+1 · η(n) + 1− η(n)
which is satisfied for all n ≥ 1. !
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